

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS
3D SQUADRON 5TH CAVALRY
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 96370

AVDE-CT

30 January 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 68
(RCS/CSPOR-65) (VIC-WDF2AA) (U)

TO: Commanding General
9th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDE-MH
APO San Francisco 96370

Section 1 Significant Organizational/Unit Activities

1. (C) Introduction: a. During the report period the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry was engaged in six major operations. These operations, with inclusive dates, were:

Santa Fe I	(4-16 November 67)
Enterprise	(16-21 November 67)
Witch	(22-26 November 67)
Santa Fe III	(1-15 December 67)
Reindeer	(16-26 December 67)
Kittyhawk	(27 December-continuing)

b. The 3-5 Cav spent the 92 days of the reporting period in the following manner:

- (1) Troop movements-seven days.
- (2) Combat and other operations-35 days.

2. (U) Organization: a. The basic composition of the squadron is: Headquarters & Headquarters Troop, three identical Armored Cavalry Troops and one Air Cavalry Troop. There were no organizational changes during the reporting period.

b. Organizational Structure and roster of key personnel are attached as inclosures.

- (1) Inclosure 1: Organizational Structure
- (2) Inclosure 2: Roster of Key Personnel.

3. (U) Personnel and Administration: a. As reflected on the Last Force Status Report this unit currently carries a C-1 rating for personnel. This report also reflected that 85% of our TOR personnel slots are filled by qualified personnel.

b. The high state of morale in the squadron is evidenced by its consistently superior performance in combat. No personnel were lost due to disciplinary actions, and only seven members of the command have been court-martialed (one special and six advisory) since the unit arrived in Vietnam.

4. (C) Intelligence: a. Enemy continues to conduct small scale actions, and harassment with mines, sniper fire and ambushes. The enemy at present maintains contact long enough to inflict damage. He breaks contact immediately when fire is returned. Most of his actions were conducted along roads and trails. For instance, the biggest ambush encountered was conducted against C/3-5 Cavalry. This ambush was triggered by an RPG round fired against the lead vehicle and a command detonated mine that was exploded under the last vehicle. The period of engagement was 10 to 12 minutes, after which contact was broken and the VC fled into the dense jungle.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR
EXPIRES 12 YRS
EFFECTIVE 12 YRS
EOD DR 620310

Incl 15 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

152

AVDE-CT
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 68
(DDO/OPFOR-SS/HTIC-WHP2AA)(U)

20 January 1968

b. Enemy Losses:

(1) Personnel:

(a) KIA: 21 (BO) 2 Poss.

(b) MIA: 4

(c) Detainees: 42 (34 were determined innocent and 8 were civil offenders).

(2) Materials, equipment and facilities captured:

(a) Rice: 3,970 lbs

(b) Medicine: Approx 2 lbs (assorted)

(c) Ammunition: 300 rds of 7.62 Gtacca, 2 Claymore mines (1 US, 1VC), 1 Grenade (1 Gtacca, 3 US).

(d) Misc: One lumber truck and eight bicycles.

(3) Materials, equipment, and facilities destroyed:

(a) 12 assorted mines blown in place.

(b) One mopan

(c) Approx 50 bunkers by demolitions, artillery and air

striker.

c. Weather and Terrain: Weather has not played a significant role in either helping or hindering operations. Weather has dense jungle been found to be an obstacle since tracked vehicles can be used to break trails. Bamboo, however, has been found to be almost impenetrable, and enemy terrain has been found unsuitable for the heavy tracked vehicles (M48 tanks).

d. Capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Enemy:

(1) Capabilities: The enemy is capable of conducting ambushes on highway 1 and 2 at will. For large scale ambushes, the local guerrillas can be augmented by one battalion of the 27th VC Regt, D-445, C-445 or D-440.

(2) Vulnerabilities: The enemy is vulnerable to ambushes, airstrikes, aggressive ground operations, and visual observation.

e. Recommendations:

(1) That all operations be conducted off of existing roads and trails to the maximum extent possible in order to avoid mines and prepared ambush sites.

(2) That all reconnaissance flights and arty preparatory fires be used only minutes prior to the beginning of an operation to minimize the enemy's ability to react.

f. Order of Battle Summary: See Inclosure 3:

5. (C) Operations: The 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry spent the entire 92 day period in the field on operations and operational related activities. During this period, the 3-5 Cav was instrumental in opening to the public, a 20 km stretch of Hwy 1 that had been previously insecure. This operation connected II Corps and III Corps with secure and improved road.

The 3-5 Cav began Operation Santa Fe I on 4 November 1967 in Long Khanh Province. The operation employed the entire squadron, minus Troop D (Air Cavalry Troop), which was placed under operational control (OPCON) to Task Force Forsyth. In addition, Op Santa Fe I was supported by elements of the 18th Infantry Division (ARVN), the First Australian Tank Force, and the 27th Engineer Battalion. Fire support was provided by A Battery, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery, which was located at Fire Support Base (FSB) Tiger (YS6490). The mission of Santa Fe I was to:

a. Locate and interdict Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army supply routes.

b. Replace and secure two Armor Vehicle Launched Bridges (AVLB) at site Chunky (YS5976).

c. Secure Chunky for ordering of allied forces and secure FSB Mon (YS6081).

d. Secure FSB Tiger and secure elements of the 18th Inf Div (ARVN).

17
30/1/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDE-CT 30 January 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 68
(RCS/CSFOR-65) (UFC-WDF2AA) (U)

- e. Provide indirect fire support.
- f. Escort logistical convoys between Blackhorse (YS4493) and Xuan Loc (YSL609).

Troop B with the help of the 1st ATF was successful in laying the AVLB's at Chunky and securing FSB's Lion and Tiger. Troops A and C were successful in their extensive reconnaissance-in-force operations and found large bunker complexes, small quantities of weapons, documents and small arms ammunition. There were four United States Personnel Killed in Action (US KIA) and nine United States Personnel Wounded in Action (US WIA). Three tanks, one Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle (ACAV) and two Rome plows were damaged as a result of rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and enemy mines.

On 16 November 1967 portions of the 3-5 Cav(-) came under the operational control of the 3d Brigade in support of Operation Enterprise. Headquarters & Headquarters Troop(-) remained OPCON to 3d Brigade, Troop A(-) remained OPCON to 5th Battalion, 60 Infantry. Troop B remained OPCON to the 43d Regiment (ARVN) continuing Operation Santa Fe I. Troop C remained OPCON to 3d Bde. Troop D remained OPCON to TF Forsyth.

While OPCON to the 3d Bde, Provisional Scout Section, WVT conducted limited mounted reconnaissance operations and convoy escort operations between Tan Thuan (XS6664) and Binh Phuoc (XS0255). Troop A(-) and Troop C(-) maintained security of Tan An base camp while conducting periodic road runner and convoy escort operations. Troop C suffered 2 WIA as a result of hostile fire. No other casualties suffered by 3-5 Cav elements.

There were no significant problems encountered while the 3-5 Cav was OPCON to 3d Bde during Operation Enterprise.

The 3-5 Cav, minus Troop B, began Operation Witch on 22 November 1967. Troop B remained OPCON to the Sector Advisor, 43rd Regt (ARVN). Supporting forces included Company B, 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry and A Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery. The missions of Operation Witch were to:

- a. Conduct search and destroy operations.
- b. Secure tactical transamphibious tree crusher.
- c. Provide security for Task Force Forsyth's Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP).
- d. Provide indirect fire support of ARVN operations, and provide Ready Reaction Forces (RRF) for Binh Son (YS2195) and Highway 15 vicinity Camp Martin Cox (YSL600).

There were 2 MIA WIA from B/2-39 Inf as a result of these operations. Two M16 rifles, one German Mauser, one 75mm Recoilless Rifle and assorted arms were captured during the operation. There were no significant problems during operation Witch. The operation ended on 26 November 1967.

On 1 December 1967 the 3-5 Cav phased into Operation Santa Fe III in Ham Tan District. The operation involved the 3-5 Cav, 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, B/35th Arty, C/1-11 Arty, a land clearing platoon, a panel bridge company and a platoon of W/15 Engr. The mission of Santa Fe III was to:

- a. Open and secure Hwy 1.
- b. Conduct reconnaissance in force operations in the TAOT.
- c. Secure fire support bases.
- d. Provide security for engr work parties upgrading Hwy 1.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

134

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDE-CT

30 January 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 68
(RCS/CSFOR-65) (JIC-DF2AA) (U)

The operation went smoothly and there was very little enemy contact. Eleven new panel bridges were constructed to replace blown bridges, and the entire road was cleared with Romo Flows and improved. The 3-5 Cav sustained no casualties or vehicular damage due to hostile action.

On the 16th of December 1967, the entire 3-5 Cav began Operation Reindeer in Long Thanh District. The operation involved the entire 3-5 Cav and supporting fires were provided by B/2-35 Arty. The missions for Operation Reindeer were:

- a. Interdict east-west enemy lines of communication across Hwy 15 between Phu My Airstrip (YS2377) and Long Thanh (YS1392).
- b. Provide RPF to Nhon Trach (RS0285), Long Thanh, Binh Son, and Camp Martin Cox areas.
- c. Conduct strike operations in AO Cambridge.

As a result of the operation, there were four US KHA, 15 US WHA, one APC was destroyed and one tank was damaged by RPG rounds. The enemy suffered 21 KHA, two WHA and two detainees. There were no significant administrative, logistical or communication problems.

On 28 December 1967, the 3-5 Cav assumed the missions of Operation Kittyhawk. These missions included:

- a. Escort of logistical convoys between Long Binh (YF0711) and Blackhorse (YSL498).
- b. Provide RPF in support of logistical convoys.
- c. Assume perimeter security of Blackhorse base camp.
- d. Provide one Armored Cavalry platoon as security for engineer effort at Gia Ray rock quarry (YF5211).
- e. Conduct operations in the Blackhorse TAOR to include ambush patrols, combat outposts, roadrunners, and reconnaissance in force missions in close coordination with the 18th Inf Div (ARVN) and Long Kham Sector forces.
- f. To provide fire support for allied operations. Fire support for Operation Kittyhawk was provided by B/2-35 Arty, A/1-84 Arty and A/1-11 Arty, successively.

As of this date Operation Kittyhawk continues with no significant change. Results to date include the following:

- a. Enemy:
 - (1) VC KHA 1
 - (2) VC Detainees 3
- b. Friendly:
 - (1) US WHA 12
 - (2) US WHA 37

No major problems have been encountered in Operation Kittyhawk.

7. (C) Logistics Operation: a. Operation Santa Fe I: (1) The 3-5 Cav began Operation Santa Fe I on 4 November 1967. All classes of supply were drawn from the 506th Supply and Service Detachment at Blackhorse. Maintenance support was provided by a contact team from A/709th Maintenance Battalion.

(2) Troop A, Troop B and Troop C were deployed to the east of Highway 2. Because of the number of mines found on the access routes to their Command Post (CP) locations it was necessary to conduct all resupply by air. Elements attempting to recover damaged vehicles had to be accompanied by a mine sweeping team and a security party. One ACHV that struck a mine was evacuated to Blackhorse base camp by a CH-54 Flying Crane.

131

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVLE-CT 30 January 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 68
(RCS/CSFOR-65) (UIC-WDF2AA) (U)

(3) Major difficulties included the continuous problem of recovering mine damaged tanks and mined ACAV's. The wet ground in the Santa Fe Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) would not support heavy combat vehicles and the problem as manifested to such proportions that it received direct Division attention.

(4) The following is a break down of PQL and ammunition used in support of Santa Fe I:

- (a) Air Sorties:
 - 1 CH-47 48
 - 2 CH-54 1
- (b) Fuel:
 - 1 Mgas 17,000 gals
 - 2 Diesel 10,000 gals
- (c) Ammunition:
 - 1 7.62mm 71,200 rds
 - 2 50 cal 18,900 rds
 - 3 5.56mm 26,240 rds
 - 4 90mm (cannister) 15 rds
 - 5 4.2mm MZ (mortar) 1,600 rds
 - 6 4.2mm Illum (mortar) 100 rds
 - 7 40mm (M-79) 3,000 rds

b. Operation Enterprise:

(1) On 16 November 1967, elements of 3-5 Cav came under operational control of the 3d Brigade in support of Operation Enterprise. Troops A and C minus tanks, road marched to Tan An (Y5554). All classes of supply were drawn from elements of 9th Supply and Transportation Battalion stationed at Tan An in support of 3d Brigade. Maintenance support was provided by the contact team from A/7-9th Maintenance, which accompanied the squadron headquarters elements to Tan An.

(2) There were no significant problems in logistics during Operation Enterprise.

c. Operation Witch: On 22 November 1967, 3-5 Cav minus Troop B began Operation Witch. All supplies were drawn from 9th Supply and Transportation Battalion at Camp Martin Cox. Resupply of the maneuver elements was conducted by land convoy. This operation terminated on 25 November 1967 with no significant problems.

d. Operation Santa Fe III:

(1) On 1 December 1967 3-5 Cav began Operation Santa Fe III. Supplies were drawn from 1st Brigade's forward supply points at Yuan Loc and FSB Wildcat (Y5815). Maintenance support was provided by the contact team from A/709th Maintenance Battalion. Additional support was provided by C/709th Maintenance Battalion, positioned at Yuan Loc.

(2) The major problem encountered was the wear and tear on five ton truck tires in the support platoon.

(3) The following is a break down of fuel, ammunition and transportation requirement for Santa Fe III:

- (a) Transportation:
 - 1 CH-47: 70 Sorties
 - 2 Five ton Trucks: 15 used for daily convoys
- (b) Fuel:
 - 1 Mgas: 16,735 gals
 - 2 Diesel: 9,740 gals

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

146

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDE-CT 30 January 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 68
(RCS/CSFGR-65) (UTC-WF2:AJ) (U)

(c) Ammunition:

1	7.62mm:	72,000 rds
2	50 cal:	19,000 rds
3	5.56mm:	25,000 rds
4	90mm (cannister)	13 rds
5	4.7 HE (mortar)	1,750 rds
6	4.2 Illum (mortar)	120 rds
7	40mm (M-79)	3,220 rds

(d) Santa Fe III terminated 15 December for 3-5 Cavalry elements.

e. Operation Reindeer:

(1) On 16 December 1967, 3-5 Cav began Operation Reindeer. Supplies were drawn from Camp Martin Cax. The troops were resupplied by land convoy.

(2) The major problem encountered during this operation was the emergency resupply of Troops C, A and B/2-35 Arty with ammunition. Resupply was conducted at night by aircraft. CH-47's from 200th Assault Helicopter Company and UH-1D's from Troop D were used for the resupply operation.

(3) Transportation, ammunition and fuel requirements for Operation Reindeer were as follows:

(a) Transportation:

1	Five Ton Trucks:	11 vehicles used in daily convoys
2	CH-47:	4 Sorties
3	UH-1D:	9 Sorties

(b) Fuel:

1	Keros:	6,015 gals
2	Diesel:	5,110 gals

(c) Ammunition:

1	7.62mm:	25,600 rds
2	50 cal:	20,790 rds
3	5.56mm:	4,920 rds
4	90mm (cannister)	50 rds
5	4.2 HE (mortar)	310 rds
6	4.2 Illum (mortar)	231 rds
7	40mm (M-79)	1,728 rds

(4) Operation Reindeer ended 26 December 1967 with the loss of one tank and one ACAV to RPG rounds.

f. Operation Kittyhawk:

(1) Operation Kittyhawk was assumed by 3-5 Cav on 28 December 1967. Class I, III and V supplies were drawn from the 506th Supply and Service Detachment at Blackhorse base camp. Maintenance support was furnished by the contact team from A/709th Maintenance Battalion.

(2) There have been no significant logistical problems encountered to this date.

(3) Transportation, fuel and ammunition requirements to date:

(a) Transportation:

1	Five Ton Trucks:	15 used daily in convoys
2	CH-47:	7 Sorties

(b) Fuel:

1	Keros:	36,350 gals
2	Diesel:	29,350 gals

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

137

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDE-CT 30 January 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 Jan 68
(RCS/CSFOR-65) (VIC-D-2AA) (U)

(c) Ammunition:		
1	7.62mm	124,000 rds
2	50 cal:	74,390 rds
3	5.56mm:	34,400 rds
4	90mm (cannister)	70 rds
5	4.2 MZ (mortar)	1,075 rds
6	4.2 Illua (mortar)	207 rds
7	40mm (M-79)	2,232 rds

(h) To date, Operation Kittyhawk has resulted in two tanks destroyed, four ACV's destroyed, one mortar track destroyed, eight ACAV's damaged, and two tanks damaged.

8. (C) Civil Affairs:

a. Mission assignments prior to the assumption of Operation Kittyhawk prevented the squadron from actively participating in a Civil Affairs program. Since assuming Operation Kittyhawk, the squadron, in conjunction with the 11th ACF, has been actively participating in the Civil Affairs program. Civic and Military leaders in the Long Khanh Province indicate that the Civil Affairs program, in conjunction with military activities, is obtaining positive results. Evidence of positive results are reflected by the decline in food prices and the increased quantity of foodstuffs available to the consumer in the city of Xuan Loc.

b. Medical Civic Action Program for the reporting period:

Location	Patients treated
Thai Thien (YS226797)	97
Trung Hiell (YS510980)	76
Cam My (YS451914)	91
Hung Loc (YT337090)	46
Hung Thanh (YT317093)	15
Cam Tan (YT3799)	54
Tai Giao (YH436017)	53
Bao Ham (YT303143)	91
Cung Thuan (YT292125)	49
Boi Thi (YH430035)	90
Bao Dinh (YH474053)	77
Tan Lap (YT393092)	123
Lang Lon (YS462024)	42
Soui Soo (YS165928)	78
Boa Toan (YH492053)	138
Trung Dau (YS372998)	31
Trung Hau (YS375995)	24
Total:	1175

c. Civil Affairs support for the month of January was:

- USAL:
- 13,000 board feet scrap lumber
- 1/2 ton scrap lumber
- 2,160 pounds foodstuff
- Five generators

- Chieu Hoi Center Xuan Loc:
- 1,050 pounds foodstuff
- 150 pounds rice
- 400 sandbags

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

30 January 1968

AVDE-CT
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 68
(RCS/CSFOR-65) (UIC-WUP2AA) (U)

one case trip flares
300 TET gifts
500 board feet scrap lumber
10 meters canvas
mattresses
14 rolls concertina wire
one volleyball net
two tether ball

Admin and Co Xuan Loc:
1,150 pounds foodstuff
200 TET gifts
4,000 board feet scrap lumber

Xuan Loc High School:
143 library books

Long Khanh High School:
two tether ball games
200 board feet lumber

Binh Loc Resettlers:
10,000 board feet lumber

52d Ranger Bn dependents:
7,100 board feet scrap lumber
600 pounds scrap lumber
10 meters canvas
300 pounds foodstuff
50 sheets roofing tin

Mat Thanh Lin:
900 pounds foodstuff
four rolls barbed wire
four rolls concertina wire

Xuan Loc Subsector:
250 pounds foodstuff
15 meters canvas

Cam My refugees:
750 pounds foodstuff

9. (U) Regional Force/Popular Force upgrading and ARVN Training: Omitted
10. (U) Engineer Support: Omitted
11. (U) Signal Support: Omitted
12. (U) Army Aviation: Omitted
13. (C) Chemical Operations: a. 3-5 Cav employed chemical munitions as follows:
- (1) K-158 cannister clusters (CS) were used against suspected VC base camps and to cover insertions of the Aero Rifle Platoon.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVIZ-CT

30 January 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 68
(RCS/CSFOR-65) (UIC-WDF2AA) (U)

(2) E-8 CS launcher was utilized throughout the squadron. Each troop has on hand a minimum of ten E-8 CS launcher. They are used in perimeter defense and are strapped on and secured to ACUV's so that they may be employed during tactical movement. Troop A had occasions to employ an E-8 during contact with satisfactory results. The Long Binh-Blackhorse convoy escort vehicles have an E-8 on each side of the vehicles to be employed as a counter ambush measure.

(3) CS 4.2 mortar ammunition has been tested by the squadron but not utilized in a combat support role.

(4) CS mini grenades have been tested by units within the squadron with satisfactory results. One man can carry more mini CS grenades than one squad can carry of the regular size grenades. They are ideally suited for clearing bunkers, spider holes, and short tunnels.

(5) M-79 CS round has been tested by B/3-5 Cav and was found to be effective against known or suspected enemy positions. The ballistics of the round proved to be as accurate as the normal PG round.

b. Planned employment of chemical munitions:

(1) E-158 will be employed on an as required basis.

(2) Z-8 will continue to be employed as it has been in

the past.

(3) The 4.2 CS mortar round is a less desirable means of delivery but may be effectively employed if it becomes available through normal supply channels.

(4) The mini CS grenade was found to be extremely effective and will be employed throughout the squadron when they become available.

(5) The M-79 CS round is in demand and will be requested as it becomes available.

(6) If bulk CS-2 is made available through supply channels it will be utilized to contaminate VC base camp areas since it is far more persistent than CS-1.

14. (U) Phase Development: Omitted

Section 2 Commander Observations and Recommendations

1. (C) Part 1 Observations:

a. Item: Defending against VC anti-tank mines.

Discussion: The VC have placed non-metallic mines during the rainy season along likely avenues for US armor vehicles. When it becomes obvious that US vehicles are going to use the mined trails the VC replace the offset firing device and power source. In other instances it seems that the long buried mines detonate for no apparent reason even though other vehicles of the same weight class have recently traversed the same area. The mines in some cases cannot be detected with the standard issue detector. The only solution to the problem is to detonate the mines safely with one of the several special devices available for this purpose.

Observation: There are apparently none of the detonating devices available in the theater. The unit is preparing a request for issue of the Roller, Mine Clearing, 20 ton w/adapter for mounting on M48 tank.

b. Item: Employment of Aero Rifle Platoon (ARP).

Discussion: The ARP can be used only for a portion of the day because of other commitments placed on the aircraft. They have been most

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

146

AVDE-CT

30 January 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Period Ending
31 Jan 68 (RCS/CSFOR-65)(UIC-DF2AA)(U)

effectively employed against intelligence targets which are located in areas that are difficult to enter in tracked vehicles. They must be supported by a ground reaction force operating close enough to the ARPTo either reinforce or extract them if they engage a superior enemy force. The best command structure for ARP operations has been to use Troop D Hqs as the controlling agency for all operations involving the ARP. The reaction force can operate independently but if committed it should be placed OPCON to the ARP.

Observation: Troop D Hqs can be best used as the command and control hqs for the ARP because of their experience in airmobile operations and their more flexible communications.

c. Item: Jungle Operations with Armor Vehicles

Discussion: The employment of armor vehicles in jungle operations has been found to be inefficient. The abuse of equipment and the advantage given to insurgent tank-killer teams is not warranted by the results achieved in these so-called "Jungle Dusting" operations. Shock effect, surprise, and mobility are sacrificed in these operations and disproportionate amount of effort must be expended in order to merely keep moving. A cavalry squadron can best be used to support jungle operations by taking up blocking positions on adjacent terrain and by making short dismounted patrols into critical areas while dismounted units conduct the major operations in dense jungle terrain. The use of tracked vehicles to merely knock down trees is a misuse of tracked weapons systems.

Observation: Dismounted infantry units should be employed in dense jungle terrain while cavalry units are employed to support the operation by taking up blocking and security missions.

d. Item: Use of Operations Code.

Discussion: Since the subordinate units do not have secure voice systems, there is no method to transmit messages securely except by using the three letter group "Operations Code". We have adapted this method to send almost all operational messages and despite the limited nature of the code, have found it to be very effective. Operators at all levels have become proficient with this code.

Observation: Continued and frequent use of the "Operation Code" will insure secure, efficient voice communications.

2. (U) Part II

Recommendations: NONE

Inclosures:

- 1 - Organizational Structure
 - 2 - Roster of Key Personnel
 - 3 - Order of Battle Summary
- Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

Michael D. ...
FSG HQT J. BARTLEY
LTC Armor
Commanding

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDE-CT 30 January 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 68
(RCS/CSFR-65) (UIC-WDF2AA) (U)

Order of Battle Summary

1. (C) Elements of the 5th VC Division continued to be the major forces opposing the 3-5 Cavalry when it assumed responsibility for the 11th Cavalry TAC/TAOI upon the regiment's departure to Phuoc Long. In early November, the 5th VC Division headquarters and support elements remained located north of the May Tao Range. By early December, the headquarters had moved north to the La Nga River. By late December, the 5th Division headquarters had moved to Phuoc Long where it presently remains.

2. (C) The 274th VC Regiment, subordinate to the 5th VC Division, remained split with two battalions dispersed in the Hat Dich and another battalion located north of the Hat Dich, south of Highway 1.

3. (C) The 275th VC Regiment, the other subordinate regiment to the 5th VC Division, also remained divided with two battalions in War Zone "D", and a third providing security to the Division headquarters. By mid-December, all elements of the 275th VC Regiment had moved to Phuoc Long.

4. (C) A newly confirmed unit in the TAC, the D440 Local Force Battalion, was reported to be dispersed about Highway 332, northwest of Gia Ray. It presently remains dispersed south of the Ha Nga River in Long Khanh Province, northwest of Xuan Loc and threatens friendly forces at Xuan Loc and Gia Ray.

5. (C) The D445 Local Force Battalion was dispersed throughout Phuoc Tuy Province into company and platoon sized units.

6. (C) The 84th Rear Service Group continued to be located in the Slope 30 area, providing logistical support to Viet Cong units.

7. (C) Local guerrilla units continued to operate against friendly forces and were responsible for numerous mining and sniping incidents.

8. (C) Current Locations- TAT:

- a. D440 VC LF Inf Bn: YT554190
- b. D445 VC LF Inf Bn: YS5872
- c. 274th VC Inf Regt:
 - (1) 1st Bn: Base War Zone "D"
 - (2) 2d and 3rd Bns: Hat Dich

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

139

Inclosure 3 to Incl 15

DOWNGRADED AT 3YR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12YRS
DOD DIR 5200.10